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1. Political indoctrination at the company level in the Soviet Army is conducted by the company political officer (Zampolit) who is usually a lieutenant or senior lieutenant. [redacted]

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[redacted] the company Zampolit receives his orders concerning political indoctrination at the battalion or regimental level. I believe that the company Zampolit delivers a 20 or 30 minute political talk every morning to the enlisted men in his company and usually once or twice a week in the evening. The Zampolit is subordinate to the commander of his unit and exerts little or no influence over him. This is in line with the policy designed to give unit commanders complete control and authority over their troops.

2. The Zampolit has the same authority over troops subordinate to him as do other officers of equivalent rank. He may mete out punishment to the same degree as other officers of his rank and may do so regardless of the party affiliations of the person or persons concerned. The Party Commission has disciplinary power only over CP members, but I do not know what these powers consist of. So far as I know the MGB has no disciplinary power over troops unless treason or espionage are involved.

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3. [redacted] the only new development I detected was the intensified anti-American campaign in the past two years. I think that political meetings for enlisted men invariably consisted of talks by the company Zampolit with little or no discussions. The political meetings for officers usually consisted of talks followed by discussions. These political sessions were a constant source of annoyance, resentment and boredom to both officers and enlisted men. There was hardly a man who did not wait impatiently for these sessions to end. Participation in

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discussions at these meetings was usually limited to some few officers who desired to impress the Zampolit or the commanding officers with their political interest and astuteness; perhaps they did manage to favorably impress the Zampolit, or the commanding officer, but they only succeeded in incurring the disfavor of the majority of officers who only wanted to leave at the earliest possible moment. Once the meeting was concluded, the only comments made about it were damning and derogatory in nature.

4. The officers had practically all types of Soviet publications available to them -- newspapers, magazines, books; however, there were no foreign publications, or at least I never saw any. I read few publications other than Literaturnaya Gazeta, Krokodil, and Ogonyek. I was practically compelled to subscribe to Propagandist-Agitator but rarely bothered to read it, a practice and attitude shared by most officers. The enlisted men also had only Soviet publications available to them in their library (Lenkonnata) but in a lesser variety. Whereas officers had access to the works of the great 19th Century Russian writers, the enlisted men's books were limited to contemporary authors. The enlisted men did not have much time to devote to reading, usually one or two Sundays a month and one or two hours each evening during the week. The enlisted men do not manifest much interest in reading because they usually prefer to spend their leisure time in writing letters or participating in sports. If a platoon leader knows that the general educational level of his men is low, he may occasionally select some sergeants to read newspapers to them.
5. I believe that the officers felt that they were generally kept informed about events which were taking place in the world but felt that the news which they received was slanted to conform with Soviet policies. For example, they knew about reverses and advances of the opposing armies in Korea and generally believed the news received in this regard; however, they were dubious about the reasons for these reverses and advances as promulgated by the Soviet press. They sensed that they were not being told the whole truth about the outside world because they could readily see that conditions at home do not approach the glowing descriptions given by the Soviet press and radio; therefore, it is reasoned by some, if the Soviets lie about conditions at home, why would they not lie about conditions abroad. This should not be blithely interpreted as an indication that all Soviet officers in East Germany know they are being fed false propaganda. As I have mentioned, they merely have some doubts about the veracity of Soviet propaganda, and every means possible -- radio broadcasts, leaflets, newspapers, etc -- should be employed to convince them that it is the West to whom they can look for the truth and that their own government is dulling their intellect with falsehoods, misrepresentations and half-truths.
6. Virtually all films shown to soldiers and officers have a political or patriotic theme. I cannot recall the titles of any films, [redacted] newsreels and documentary films which usually lacked the omnipresent political theme of other Soviet films. The Officer's Club showed films two or three times weekly for officers; and I think that enlisted men were shown films once weekly at the Officers' Club but always in groups and with an officer escort.

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7. Most officers and enlisted men spend their leisure time in letter writing, group sports, reading, playing chess or checkers, or in idle talk. Another favorite pastime, especially for officers who can occasionally receive permission to visit a nearby city, is looking for something to drink.
8. There is little doubt that many Soviet officers in East Germany listen to foreign radio broadcasts. Enlisted men have little or no opportunity to listen because, generally speaking, they do not have access to radios. It is impossible to determine the extent or frequency of foreign broadcast listening among Soviet troops because of the punishments which are dealt out to those detected. As a consequence of the fear of being detected or even being reported for listening to foreign radio broadcasts, an officer or enlisted man would be jeopardizing himself by discussing the subject whether he had listened or not. I had of course heard of VOA and BBC but I had never heard about the Voice of Free Russia. It is extremely important to penetrate Soviet jamming to enable the ~~Soviet~~ people to learn the truth about the West; in this respect talks by recent Soviet defectors are particularly convincing. Emphasis should be on the friendship which the American people and government feel toward the ~~Soviet~~ people. The blatant lies of Soviet propaganda should constantly be exposed, particularly when it affects the material well-being of the ~~Soviet~~ people--such as living conditions, material gains, wages. In comparing and contrasting these with those of the West, however, one should be cautious to avoid deprecating the achievements of the ~~Soviet~~ people; rather, it behooves the West to show the ~~Soviet~~ people that their standard of living is so low because of the Soviet's preparations for an aggressive war and their total disregard for the welfare of the ~~Soviet~~ people in their pursuit of this policy. I firmly believe that Western propaganda should refrain from advocating the carving up of the Soviet Union into independent states; instead, emphasis should be placed on a plebiscite which would leave the problem of self-determination in the hands of the peoples of the various republics. Every attempt should be made to broadcast the truth on all subjects because the people of the Soviet Union have had too much experience with falsehoods to be deceived by untrue news from the West.
9. The stringent restrictions upon the Soviet troops in East Germany permeate every possible activity of their lives, particularly in respect to freedom of movement, drinking, and contacts with the German population. These restrictions and the inordinately severe penalties for violations of them are not conducive to high morale or satisfaction with prevailing conditions. It should not be inferred from this, however, that the Soviet armed forces in East Germany constitute a seething nucleus of discontent in the Soviet Army which will break out into open rebellion in the event of war. I believe it would be more accurate to say that, should hostilities break out, the Soviet troops would look upon it as a release from their confinement and attack with little regard for the casualties which would inevitably follow. However, should they be stopped by superior forces, compelled to retreat, and then exposed to a greatly intensified, intelligent and effective program of psychological warfare, I feel that rebellion would surely follow. This does not preclude, of course, the necessity for conducting a continuous program of psychological warfare prior to the outbreak of hostilities, inasmuch as this would create an atmosphere of disaffection which would facilitate and catalyze any revolt which might be forthcoming. Again I would like to emphasize the urgent need to employ all the media available for propaganda purposes to counteract Soviet propaganda and convince the

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Soviet people that the West is friendly toward them but unalterably opposed to their government.

10. Should Eisenhower be elected to the presidency of the United States the Soviet propaganda would seize upon this and exploit it to the fullest as irrefutable proof that America is preparing to attack the Soviet Union. This propaganda line will of course be followed regardless of who is elected. The people of the Soviet Union know Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the West during World War II and as the commander of NATO forces. He has already been reviled by the Soviets and his election to the presidency will be offered as confirmation of their charges against him as a warmonger and as proof of the warlike intentions of the United States Government and the American people. In view of Eisenhower's reknown as a military leader the Soviet people are likely to place more credence in Soviet propaganda along this line than if a non-military man were elected.

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